[COM] Euthyphro

Introduction

When I first read the Euthyphro, I imagine that my reaction was much the same as it is for most people who read it – utter bafflement as to what the point of this semantic exercise was. It is, at first reading, not entirely clear what the purpose of the dialogue is, not in the least because it ends at an impasse. So naturally I looked to wiser men than myself to explain what the dialogue was about but that, too, turned out to be less than fruitful.

Much of the historical discussion on the Euthyphro centers on its chief dilemma – the eponymously named Euthyphro dilemma. Is something holy because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy? The way that Christian thinkers have responded to this question is by reframing it in terms of divine command. Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? But this is where I find previous discussions to be unsatisfactory. It does not seem to me that the Euthyphro deals with divine command theory at all, as many modern readers seem to presume.

The more I considered the dilemma, the more it started to become clear to me that the Euthyphro dilemma is not dealing with questions of holiness and piety as such. It’s not a theological meditation on this topic as much as it is a discussion on the nature of the Absolute. This is the common thread of most Platonic dialogues, at last as I understand them. Therefore, it is from that perspective that we will deal with the Euthyphro, one of Plato’s more challenging dialogues.

Context and Composition

As I have mentioned in my previous commentary on the Symposium, the Platonic dialogues are literary creations meant to illustrate the ideas of Plato. We are therefore not dealing with historical discussions between historical people. Everything – from the characters involved to the context of the dialogue to the topics discussed and the way they are discussed – has been chosen by Plato to communicate the ideas he wishes to communicate. We find Plato as much in the composition and structure of his dialogues as we do in the contents of the discussion itself. We must therefore begin by looking at the composition of the Euthyphro as a whole.

The Euthyphro is framed as a discussion on piety and justice between Socrates and Euthyphro, a soothsayer who is supposedly very knowledgeable about Greek religion. The occasion of their meeting is by the porch of the king magistrate, where they have both come to argue a case in court. Euthyphro is there to prosecute his father for the killing of a worker, while Socrates is there to defend himself against the charge of impiety that would eventually lead to his execution.

Because of the nature of the accusation against Socrates, he interrogates Euthyphro on what holiness is, so that he can use this knowledge to defend himself. What follows is a long back and forth between the two where four attempts are made at defining holiness, each shot down by Socrates, until the conversation ends inconclusively.

Contrast Between Euthyphro And Socrates

Already we can note a few interesting things about how Plato has chosen to frame this dialogue. The first is that there is an implicit contrast between the subject matter and the context. The two are discussing holiness against the backdrop of the impending trial of Socrates where, in Plato’s mind, he was unjustly sentenced to death. This contrast is likewise present in the two speakers themselves – Euthyphro is there as a prosecutor while Socrates is there as defendant.

This is an instance of a common theme in Platonic literature, namely the corrupt nature of society. There is an inherent dichotomy between truth and politics in the teachings of Plato, exemplified best in dialogues such as the Apology and the Gorgias, which I will also be commenting on. Plato makes this explicit with this comment from Socrates.

“I don’t think the Athenians mind all that much if they think someone is clever, so long as he doesn’t teach his wisdom. But they do get angry – either from envy, as you suggest, or for some other reason – with anyone who makes other people like himself.” (Euthyphro 3d)

The contrast between Euthyphro and Socrates goes further than just them being prosecutor and defendant in their respective cases. There is also a linking of Euthyphro with the prosecutor of Socrates, a man named Meletus, through Socrates’ use of irony. When asked by Euthyphro what charge Meletus is bringing against him, he responds as follows.

“One which does him credit, I think. It is no small thing for a young man to possess the knowledge he possesses. He knows, so he claims, what has harmful effect on the young, and who has this effect. I think he must be someone very clever, who has seen through my ignorance and my bad influence on his contemporaries.” (Euthyphro 2c)

It is clear enough that Socrates is taking jibes at the man for his supposed wisdom in knowing good from evil. But he makes similar jibes against Euthyphro. When Euthyphro explains that he is there to prosecute his father for the charge of murder, Socrates responds as follows.

“Heracles! I wouldn’t have thought most people had any idea what the right course of action is here. It’s not absolutely anyone, if you ask me, who would act in this way. Only someone far advanced in wisdom, I should imagine.” (Euthyphro 4b)

The similarity in the irony against Meletus and Euthyphro – both prosecutors who claim to be wise – is evident. This link is conclusively established when Socrates invites Euthyphro to teach him the true meaning of what is holy and unholy, so that he may use this knowledge in his trial against Meletus.

“I’ve had a marvelous idea, Euthyphro! Why don’t I become your pupil? Then I can challenge Meletus, before the case, on precisely this point. […] ‘Look, Meletus,” I can say, ‘if you agree that Euthyphro is an expert on the subject, then you can take it that I have the right attitude too, and you needn’t go on with your lawsuit.’” (Euthyphro 5a-b)

This link provides us with some understanding of what Euthyphro’s role is in the dialogue. He acts as a representative of the litigious and overconfident political man, and he acts more specifically as the representative of Greek popular religion at the time through his role as a soothsayer and prophet. The contrast between him and Socrates is therefore meant to signify that Plato is interrogating the common understanding of religion, and offering instead his own philosophical understanding in its place.

It is important to note here that there are no accounts of Euthyphro as a historical person outside of the Platonic corpus, leading me to believe that he may be an entirely fictional character. It is possible, therefore, that the very case he is prosecuting against his father is a literary creation by Plato. It would therefore be wise of us to interpret it as such, and look towards its meaning.

Euthyphro’s Case

The case that Euthyphro is bringing to the king magistrate involves the murder of a worker by his father. According to Euthyphro’s account, the worker had killed a slave in a drunken stupor. Euthyphro’s father had apprehended the worker and tied him up before leaving him in a ditch until the Interpreter could come and decide what to do. The father had reasoned that it didn’t matter what happened to the worker since he was a murderer. Consequently, the worker died of exposure before the Interpreter could arrive.

Euthyphro’s case seems to be deliberately crafted to be morally ambiguous. On the one hand, the worker is clearly at fault for killing the slave. On the other, the father is clearly at fault for his negligence. There is also a central concern in the text as to whether a son has any right to prosecute his own father, as Plato has Euthyphro himself explain.

“That’s why my father and the rest of my family are actually quite annoyed with me, because I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer. […] They said it was unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder.” (Euthyphro 4d-e)

At the same time Euthyphro gives a reason for pursuing his case that would be sympathetic to the philosophically minded audience of Plato.

“As if it made any difference whether the man who was killed was a stranger or a member of my family. The only thing we should take any notice of is whether or not he that slew, slew justly.” (Euthyphro 4b)

This case cuts at the heart of both ancient Athenian and universally human ethical concerns, and the moral ambiguity is intentional. Plato wants to show just how difficult it is for us to know what the right course of action is. A key theme of the Platonic corpus is the question of what is good and how to know this, and the answer that Plato gives is that the Good is a transcendental that can only be known by someone who has experienced it directly. Thus, Socrates is often made to challenge the moral intuitions and hubristic attitudes of Plato’s contemporaries. This dialogue is no exception, and after Euthyphro confidently states that his family has no idea what is unholy, Socrates replies as follows.

“And what about you, for heaven’s sake, Euthyphro? Do you regard yourself as such an authority on religion – on things holy and unholy – that after events such as you describe you can take your father to court with no fear that you in your turn may in fact be doing something unholy?” (Euthyphro 4e)

Plato is being explicit with us here – he is challenging us to consider just how well we truly know right from wrong. The nature of Euthyphro’s case is very important in framing what the real purpose of the dialogue itself is. It is not about piety or impiety, nor about definitions and word games, nor about whether god commands one thing or another. It is about showing the existence of, and the moral necessity of knowing, the Absolute as the one determining Form of the Good.

We now understand why Plato has set Euthyphro as a contrast to Socrates, and what the purpose of the dialogue is. Euthyphro is the confident Athenian society, which thinks itself wise when it isn’t, while Socrates is the philosopher who has seen Absolute. The purpose of the dialogue, therefore, is to teach us something about this Absolute through the clash between these two characters. This brings us to the meat of the text, namely the four attempts at defining holiness.

First Definition – Euthyphro’s Prosecution

After presenting the context of the dialogue and the characters involved, Plato introduces through the words of Socrates the central question around which the dialogue proper revolves.

“[…] isn’t what is holy unvarying in every activity, while what is unholy is the opposite of everything holy, and also unvarying – so that anything at all which is going to be unholy possesses a single form in respect of its unholiness? […] Tell me then, what do you say the holy is? And what do you say the unholy is?” (Euthyphro 5d)

Plato gives the following answer through Euthyphro.

“I say the holy is what I am doing now, prosecuting the person who is guilty of an offence such as murder, or stealing from temples, or some other crime of that sort – be he father, mother or anyone at all. And not prosecuting him is unholy.” (Euthyphro 5d-e)

This answer by Euthyphro should be relatable to nearly every reader. Often, when we are asked to give an account of what is good or evil, we find it impossible to actually define good or evil. Instead we take to examples to show what we mean. If I were to ask a man on the street what evil is, he would in all likelihood answer that killing is evil, or stealing, or similar things of that nature. If pressured to actually define good and evil absolutely, he would be tongue-tied.

We see that this is exactly what Euthyphro is doing here. He is giving concrete examples of things he knows – or thinks he knows – is good and evil. But the astute reader will clearly see the problem with this. The whole purpose of Socrates’ question is to know that by which we can know that murder is evil, and prosecuting murderers is good. We are seeking the universal, not the particular. This first definition is made by Plato precisely to put our focus on the universal, as he makes explicit in the following passage from Socrates.

“Do you remember my question, then? I didn’t ask you to tell me just one or two of the many holy things, but to tell me the actual form as a result of which all holy things are holy. You did say, didn’t you, that unholy things were unholy, and holy things holy, as a result of a single form?” (Euthyphro 6e)

This is not a small nitpick by Plato, but central to the question. If there is not one unifying form by which we can determine good from evil, then these are arbitrary terms. This reasoning can be extended from the moral to the metaphysical – if there is not one unifying ground of existence, then reality itself will be an arbitrary, self-contradictory and jumbled mess. The Absolute, therefore, cannot be a thing among things, but is that which makes it possible for there to be things at all, and for these things to be in that particular way in which they are.

This question is further dealt with in the next definition given by Euthyphro, but before we move one I would like to look at Euthyphro’s reasoning for why his case is just. He claims that his case is just because it emulates the mythological actions of Zeus himself.

“But the same people who regard Zeus as the best and the most just of the gods – though they admit he bound his own father for swallowing his children unjustly, and that he in his turn had castrated his father before him for the same kind of reasons – still get annoyed with me for prosecuting my father when he does wrong.” (Euthyphro 6a)

Socrates finds two faults with this reasoning.

“Is that the reason, Euthyphro, why I am having a charge brought against me – because I can’t bring myself to accept it when people tell stories like that about the gods? […] And is there really war against one another among the gods, do you think? And terrible quarrels and battles, and all those stories we hear about from the poets?” (Euthyphro 6a-c)

What Plato is saying here is twofold. The first is that we ought not to take mythological stories literally. The gods are not people, and their behavior in the myths is often allegorical rather than instructive. The second is that many of the stories about the gods involve conflict between them, but as we shall see in the next definition, this causes some problems. Since the gods are the modalities of the Absolute, they cannot be in any true conflict with each other, since this would lead us back to the problem of self-contradiction that we have already mentioned. For reality to be one continuous whole, there must be agreement on a fundamental level between all levels and modalities of reality.

This brings us nicely to Euthyphro’s second definition.

Second Definition – Beloved By The Gods

After having been reminded by Socrates what the discussion is about, Euthyphro answers with the following definition.

“What is dear to the gods is holy. What is not dear to them is unholy.” (Euthyphro 7a)

However, as we have already seen, Socrates has a particular critique against this definition.

“And that there is civil war among the gods, Euthyphro – that they disagree with one another, that there is hostility among them towards one another – has this been said as well?” (Euthyphro 7b)

In the myths of the Ancient Greeks, the gods are frequently fighting amongst each other over all manner of things. The perhaps best example of this is found in the Iliad, where the gods are divided into two camps – most notably, Aphrodite, Ares and Apollo support Troy, while Athena and Hera support the Achaeans, with Zeus acting as a somewhat partial mediator. 

My readers will remember that the Trojan War was caused by the Trojan prince Paris abducting Helen, the wife of the Spartan king. Winning the heart of Helen was Paris’ reward for choosing Aphrodite as the most beautiful of the goddesses. We must therefore ask ourselves if abducting Helen was just or unjust. Aphrodite clearly supported it, while Athena and Hera did not.

It is this problem that Plato is singling out in this section. He makes this explicit in the exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro that follows, where Socrates makes the following remarks.

“In which case, my noble Euthyphro, the gods have conflicting opinions about what things are just, according to your account of the matter. […] What one group of gods regards as beautiful, good and just – is that what is dear to them? And are their opposites hateful to them? […] And the same things, according to you, are regarded as just by one group and unjust by another. […] So the same things are apparently both hated by the gods and loved by them. […] In which case, Euthyphro, on this argument, would the same thing be both holy and unholy?” (Euthyphro 7d-8b)

This is precisely the argument we made earlier, that disagreement on a metaphysical level is impossible since it would make a self-consistent reality impossible. Note that while Plato plays along with the assertion that the gods are in conflict with one another, he also makes it clear in multiple asides that he doesn’t share this view. In the Platonic view, reality is not in conflict with itself. What is expressed in the myths as conflict represents dynamism between modes of reality, rather than conflict proper. Day is replaced by night, war with peace, life with death and so on, but this is the same Absolute expressing itself in many ways rather than multiple competing Absolutes fighting for supremacy.

This is Plato’s way of critiquing the common understanding of religion that the Greeks of his time had. As Plato mentions in other works, this idea of the gods having petty conflicts with one another is ultimately a disrespectful attitude to have towards them.

If the previous definition showed us that the Absolute must be universal, than this definition shows us that the Absolute must be a unity. While this doesn’t prevent the Absolute from taking many forms – forms which we associate with the various Greek divinities of Plato’s time – these forms are ultimately in harmony with one another. We are reminded of the argument made in the Symposium, where Plato argues that harmony arises out of two conflicting elements when they cease to conflict.

This marks the main point of the second section of the Euthyphro, but Plato makes a few other points before he moves towards the third definition.

“And what about the world of men, Euthyphro? Have you never heard anyone there arguing that the man who has killed someone unjustly, or acted unjustly in some other way, should not pay the penalty? […] Do they actually admit to doing wrong, Euthyphro? And then claim, despite this admission, that they should not pay the penalty?” (Euthyphro 8c)

One of the more subtle arguments that Plato makes in favor of his idea of there being one Form of the Good is that we all possess a certain inherent disposition that points towards it. No one does what he thinks is evil, but what he thinks is good. In those cases where someone does evil it is because he believes it to be good. But while we may be wrong in our conception of what is good, none of us disagree that we want what is good and to do what is good. Therefore, there must be some inherent goodness which we are instinctively seeking.

Plato makes this argument explicit in the following passage, and connects it with the theological implications of his previous argument.

“In which case, they’re not arguing that the wrong-doer should not pay the penalty. What they’re arguing about, perhaps, is who is doing wrong, what he is doing, and when. […] Isn’t it just the same with the gods, if they quarrel about justice and injustice – as you say they do? Each party says the other is in the wrong, while the others deny it.” (Euthyphro 8d)

Just like we have an inherent disposition towards the good, though our understanding of the good may vary, Plato is here suggesting that the same ought to be true of the gods. If the gods quarrel – which Plato does not believe that they do – it is because they are trying to arrive to that one goodness of which they, like us, are intuitively aware. We see in this section two arguments for the unity of the Absolute – the first, that there cannot be metaphysical disagreement, and the second, that any apparent disagreement arises from a dynamic process of the Absolute expressing itself.

With these comments, we are ready to move forwards to the third definition.

Third Definition – Beloved By All The Gods

After having answered Euthyphro’s claims in the second section, Socrates suggests a third definition to Euthyphro, which he accepts.

“What all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy.” (Euthyphro 9d)

This definition would presumably solve the issues we’ve seen in the previous sections. It is a universal statement, and it removes the problem of metaphysical disagreement which we have concluded to be impossible. The Form of the Good, therefore, is what all the gods love. There is only one problem with this – the eponymous Euthyphro dilemma, presented by Socrates as follows.

“Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? (Euthyphro 9d)

This seems at first glance like a dumb word game, but closer inspection will reveal what the issue is really about. Plato clarifies it with a few examples.

“I’ll try to make it clearer. Do we talk about being carried and carrying? Being led and leading? Being seen and seeing? In all these examples, are you aware that the two are different from one another – and what the difference is? […] Is there a thing loved and – different from it – a thing which loves?” (Euthyphro 10a)

The contrasting usage by Plato of the active and the passive voice is the key to understanding what the Euthyphro dilemma is really about. What is expressed in the active voice – carrying, leading, seeing, loving, etc. – is an agent, a subject, something which acts and performs the verbal action. What is expressed in the passive voice – carried, led, seen, loved, etc. – is an object that is subjected to the verbal action by the agent that performs the action. In other words, is the property that arises from the verbal action inherent to the actor or to the object acted upon?

The love through which things become holy – does this flow from the holy thing to the gods through its being beloved, or does it flow from the gods to the thing through their act of loving? This is the core of the Euthyphro dilemma. Are the properties of things inherent to them, or are they external? Do truth, beauty and goodness arise from outside of us, or are they within us?

To answer this question, Plato begins to elaborate on his own examples.

“So the reason for its being seen isn’t because it is a thing seen. It’s the other way round. It is a thing seen because it is seen.” (Euthyphro 10b)

A thing seen is not seen because it has “being seen” as one of its properties. Rather, it is the act of someone seeing the thing that gives it the property of being seen. By this same argument, that which is loved is so because someone loves it. Its property of being beloved is external to it, just like the property of being seen is external to seen objects. Plato makes this explicit.

“It’s not because it’s a thing loved that it is loved by those who love it. It’s a thing loved because it is loved.” (Euthyphro 10c)

However, this causes us to run into a problem when we return to our third definition of holiness. We understand implicitly that holiness, or goodness, or truth, etc. are properties that are inherent to the object. Therefore, we arrive to the paradox that holiness and being beloved by the gods is not the same thing – one is inherent and the other is external. This contradicts our third definition.

Plato writes the following.

“So it is loved because it is holy, and not holy because it is loved? […] But it’s because it is loved that it is a thing loved by the gods, and dear to the gods? […] In which case, what is dear to the gods is not holy, nor is the holy dear to the gods as you claim. These are two different things.” (Euthyphro 10d-

The Euthyphro dilemma arises out of the problem that goodness both seems to come from somewhere outside of the thing and to be inherent to the thing. It is this apparent contradiction that must be reconciled for the dilemma to be solved.

It is at this point where the reader may start to question what the point of all of this is. As you may recall, we set out to establish the thing which, if we know it, we also know what is good and evil. But just like how Agathon in the Symposium accused his fellows of praising only what Eros does and not what he is, so Socrates is here accusing Euthyphro of showing him a property of the Absolute (that it is beloved) rather than showing what it really is. Plato makes this explicit.

“My guess is, Euthphyro, that when you were asked what exactly the holy is, you didn’t want to reveal its essential being to me. So you told me one of its properties. You said the holy has the property of being loved by the gods.” (Euthyphro 11a)

The astute reader may have already conceived at this point of a solution:  if the Absolute is both present within the things and external to them, then the properties of the things can be both inherent to them and arise seemingly from outside of them. This would be the nondualistic answer to this problem, a problem that arises only due to the apparent duality between inherent properties and their source in the Absolute. In other words, the Absolute underlies all of reality and everything in reality flows from it and participates in it in such a way that it is non-different in essence from the Absolute.

I believe this is the solution that Plato is presenting in the following passage, using the most convoluted language possible.

“If what is dear to the gods and the holy were the same thing, Euthyphro, then if the holy was loved because it was holy, and what is dear to the gods was loved because it was dear to the gods, and if what is dear to the gods was dear to the gods because it was loved by the gods, then the holy would be holy because it was loved.” (Euthyphro 10e-11d)

With this bit of gibberish we move on to the fourth and final attempt at defining holiness.

Fourth Definition – Holiness Is Justice

As we saw in the previous section of the text, the problem of the Euthyphro dilemma comes from how things can have properties, and whether these properties are inherent to them or arise from outside of them. Plato makes this explicit in the challenge that Socrates gives to Euthyphro at the end of the third section.

“Tell me again, starting at the beginning, what exactly the holy is that makes it loved by the gods, or gives it any of its properties.”  (Euthyphro 11b)

Since Euthyphro admits to being unable to answer this, Socrates hands him a suggestion, which forms the fourth definition.

“You strike me as being a bit lazy, so I’m going to do my best to help you teach me about what is holy. Don’t give up just yet. See whether you think that everything holy must necessarily be just.” (Euthyphro 11b)

Plato is here suggesting a connection between justice and holiness. In other words, if the holy is just by necessity, then we can know what the holy is by knowing what justice is. The reader may think that this just leads to kicking the can further down the road, as it were, since that still leaves us with the problem of defining justice. But defining justice is a major project in the Platonic corpus, especially in the Republic, where Plato arrives to the conclusion that justice is the proper harmonious ordering of different elements.

If the holy is by necessity just, then it follows that holiness is a form of the proper harmonious ordering of existence. If we know this order, then we would also know the form by which, if it be known, it may also be known what is good and evil. We see here that Platonic justice has great similarities with the Eastern conceptions of Dharma.

But what do we mean that the holy is by necessity just? Plato clarifies the question.

“Is the holy a subset of the just? […] If the holy is part of the just, it looks as if we need to find out what kind of part of the just the holy is.” (Euthyphro 12d)

In other words, the problem of the relationship between holiness and justice is one of the part to the whole. Justice is the whole, encompassing all harmonious order, while holiness is one of the parts that make up this harmonious order. If the holy is as we have described it, being a form of the proper harmonious order of existence, we must still know the particularities of it in relation to its whole.

Since Euthyphro accepts that the holy is by necessity just, he offers the following answer to this question.

“In my opinion, that part of the just which has to do with looking after the gods is pious and holy. The part which looks after men forms the remaining part of justice.” (Euthyphro 12e)

As we have seen throughout the dialogue, Plato has used Euthyphro as a foil for Socrates, using him as a mouthpiece for the popular religion of the time. It was the commonly held view that the relationship between men and the gods was transactional, that each party looked after the other in some way. Plato makes it explicit that he is discussing this transactional view.

“On this definition, then, the holy would be a knowledge of asking the gods for things and giving things to them.” (Euthyphro 14d)

However, given the interpretation we made in the third section we can clearly see that this transactional view makes little sense. Because the Absolute underlies all of reality, being present in and transcending all things, and since all things derive their very being from the Absolute, we can see that the duality of the things and the Absolute is false. There must be a duality between giver and receiver for there to be a transaction, and since there is no such duality in a metaphysical sense, there can be no transaction. The gods derive nothing from our worshipping them.

As we shall see, this is the argument that Plato makes. He has Socrates make the following comments.

“Presumably you don’t mean that looking after the gods is like looking after other things. […] Take horses, for example. […] Horsemanship consists, I take it, in looking after horses. […] And holiness and piety in looking after the gods, Euthyphro? Is that what you’re saying? […] In which case, does all looking after have the same effect? […] Looking after is in some way for the good or benefit of the thing looked after. When horses are looked after by the art of horsemanship, for example, you can see that it does them some good. […] would you agree that when you do something holy, the effect is to make one of the gods better?” (Euthyphro 13a-c)

Naturally, the answer to the final question is no. The Absolute cannot be improved by any action made by the particulars, since any goodness or perfection they have, by which they could improve something, comes from the Absolute itself. It is in this way that we can know that the Absolute must be absolutely good – because there is nothing in existence we can point to that is better than it in any sense, since that thing’s goodness comes from the Absolute.

We can relate this back to the question of the relationship between the parts to the whole. Since the whole is absolute, the part exists as it does as part only in relation to the whole. In other words, there is a whole without the part but no part without the whole. This must be so, for a thing cannot be a part unless there is a whole for it to be a part of. Fitting into the whole completes the part, because there is ultimately no separation between part and whole. Its being a part separate from the whole is illusory, since it was always defined by the whole.

We can conclude, therefore, that worshipping the gods is not like training horses. Plato has Socrates lead Euthyphro to this conclusion, and Euthyphro responds by further clarifying what he means by “looking after”.

“The kind practiced by slaves, Socrates, when they look after their masters.” (Euthyphro 13d)

Plato continues using Euthyphro as the mouthpiece of popular religion. The Greeks did believe that, while they had a transactional relationship with the gods, the gods were clearly their superiors. But the argument we’ve made so far still applies, as Plato shows in the following comments.

“Some sort of service to the gods, by the sound of it. […] Very well. Take the art which is a service to doctors. In the achievement of what end is it in fact of service? Don’t you think it’s health? […] Pray, tell me, then. This art which is of service to the gods – in the achievement of what end would it be of service? […] what exactly is this wonderful result which is achieved by the gods, using us as their servants?” (Euthyphro 13d-e)

The question raised here by Plato is subtle. Having established that the particulars cannot imprint their being on the Absolute, the question becomes if the Absolute can imprint its being on the particulars. But as we’ve concluded already, the particulars have no being outside of the being of the Absolute in which they partake. The essence of Absolute and particular, of part and whole, is non-different – the duality is illusory. We arrive back to the Euthyphro dilemma and its answer, just as Plato does with the following questions by Socrates.

“Tell me, though, what is the actual benefit to the gods of the presents they get from us?” (Euthyphro 15a)

To which Euthyphro replies as follows.

“What you’d expect. Respect, honour, and as I said a little while ago, what gives them pleasure.” (Euthyphro 15a)

Attempting to define holiness by using justice brings us back to the same dilemma as in the third section. Plato makes this explicit.

“In which case, apparently, the holy turns out once again to be what is loved by the gods. […] Don’t you realise our definition has gone round in a circle and come back to where we started?” (Euthyphro 15b-c)

We have now arrived at the end of the Euthyphro. After Socrates points out how their argument has returned to its initial conundrum, he pleads with Euthyphro not to abandon the discussion. In his characteristic irony, he insists that Euthyphro is keeping the truth about what is holy and unholy from him.

“You know the answer […] If you didn’t have a clear idea of the holy and unholy, you couldn’t possibly have set about prosecuting your father, who is an old man, on a charge of murder, on behalf of a mere tenant. Your fear of the gods would have kept you from taking the chance that you might turn out to be acting incorrectly.” (Euthyphro 15d)

The reader will remember what we said in the beginning of this Commentary. Euthyphro’s case is deliberately crafted to be morally ambiguous. It is difficult to know what the right course of action is – unless one knew the Form from which all goodness derives. The overconfidence of Euthphyro is contrasted by his inability to resolve the dilemma presented by Socrates. In this interrogation of the public religion and the moral hubris of the common man, Plato finds his contemporaries wanting.

The Ending Of Euthyphro

The Euthyphro famously ends at an impasse. Euthyphro excuses himself from the conversation and Socrates laments his loss of the opportunity to learn the secret of goodness from the overly confident Euthyphro.

Like all the rest of this dialogue, the ending is almost certainly a literary choice made by Plato. Not only does it illustrate the intellectual arrogance of Euthyphro and of the public understanding, but more importantly, it leaves the question open for the reader to answer. As I mentioned in my Commentary on the Symposium, the Platonic dialogues were most likely written for the purpose of being discussed by his students. The full answer is left to the students themselves to figure out on their own.

I have already given my answers throughout the text, but I will attempt to end with my interpretation and summary of what the Euthyphro is teaching.

The Nonduality Of Duality

The Euthyphro begins with a simple question – how do we determine the right course of action? It is a universal problem that all of mankind faces. And it is equally universal for all of us to be very sure of ourselves, sometimes aggressively so, even though we have not the slightest idea most of the time. The margin of error is huge given the confluence of arrogance and ignorance which is so typical of humanity.

It is quickly made clear to us in the text that to escape the mire of opinion we must establish ourselves firmly in what is real and true. Only by standing on the ground of goodness can we know what is good. But for this foundation of reality to be such, it must be both universal and self-consistent. Opinions are relative and in constant contradiction, but if we can find that reality which is all-encompassing and in complete agreement with itself, then we will have sure footing beneath our feet.

Having established this much, we reach the core of the Euthyphro. What does “all-encompassing and self-consistent” really mean? You see, life presents us with a stark contradiction. On the one end is I, and on the other is the world with which I interact. I, as a being, am separate from all other beings. The world appears divided, and this separation between subject and object is the primordial division. How can unity of existence even be possible in a world of division?

This is the heart of the Eutyphro dilemma. On which side of the primordial division does the foundation of reality lie? Does the world exist in me, or I in it? Does what I am come from me, or does it come from outside of me? Is a thing holy because it is loved, or is it loved because it is holy?

But there is a subtle solution to this problem of division that we can only really see if we look beyond the apparent duality of the world. For two things to exist in opposition to each other they must both exist, meaning that they share one important quality. They share being, a quality that transcends them, defines them and encompasses them both. A coin flipped will show either heads or tails, but it is still one coin. The two sides, the duality and division between them, are united in the reality of the coin.

This is equally true of the primordial division between subject and object. They are not two separate realities, but are part of one reality that encompasses and transcends them both. What you are internally is no less real than what appears before you externally. You both share the same ground of reality, are two expressions of the same being. Thus the foundation of one thing and the foundation of all things is one and the same. We call this foundation the Absolute, and everything that exists is this Absolute, like parts containing and being contained in the whole.

This Absolute, which is beyond any one thing, produces out of itself the whole ensemble of existence through this interplay of unity and division. It is what makes reality a living, breathing, multiplicitous whole. It is the play of reality, the appearance of one thing as many to itself in order to express itself. Not one thing exists that isn’t it, and not one thing exists that does not play its part in this great cosmic game. Through finitude the infinite expresses its infinity, and wholeness reveals its wholeness throughout all of its parts.

So what of Euthyphro’s case? Since we all share in the same ground of being, we also share in the foundation of all goodness, for being and goodness are one. When we act, we do not act as some disembodied spectator but as one expression of that very same Absolute. When we act, it flows from us and back into itself. When we act in the world, the world likewise acts in us, for we are one and the same.

But though we are one in our innermost being, we are still two in our expression. I am, but I am in my particular way and not in any other. It is likewise in the moral sense – I ought, but I ought in my particular way and not in any other. This is so because just like Being is one expressing itself as many beings, likewise the Good is one expressing itself as many goods. It may be courage for one to fight and courage for another to refuse to fight, but it is still courage. Likewise, temperance for one may be to restrain their hedonism while for another it is to restrain their self-mortification, yet it is temperance all the same.

This is why Socrates urges Euthyphro to give an account of his goodness, for only Euthyphro can do this. Socrates cannot, for the goodness of Socrates is not that of Euthyphro, though it is goodness just the same. When Euthyphro fails to do this, because he cannot apprehend his own innermost being, the discussion ends to Socrates’ lamentations. No goodness is possible for those who do not know the ground of all being within themselves.

So what, then, is holiness? It is when the being within is in complete union with the being without, when the Absolute pours itself back into itself from itself. It is when we see God through the same eye that God sees us. It is when the lover and the beloved are of one being, one accord, one heart.

It is wholeness.

References

Plato. (1997) Symposium And The Death Of Socrates. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Edition Limited. Translated by Tom Griffith.