A distinction I frequently make, but which seems to cause some confusion, is that between morality and moralism. This is not a distinction that I make for any linguistic reason related to the dictionary definitions of the words. Rather, it is because I have found it necessary to untangle two separate phenomena that are often conflated. The topic of morality is notoriously difficult to deal with because of how entangled the concepts of good, value and judgment are with power, desire and justification. In short, while we may strive towards an objective understanding of absolute good, we rarely achieve this due to the peculiarities of human psychology. As Nietzsche so astutely discovered, our loftiest moral pretensions tend to hide the basest motivations, and this realization is the cause of my general moral skepticism. The purpose of this essay is, therefore, to provide a conceptual distinction that I have found very useful in navigating these questions.